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The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance the Problem?
Juscelino F. Colares∗
Mainstream international trade law scholars have commented positively on the work
of WTO adjudicators. This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by
empirical scholarship that shows a high disparity between Complainant and
Respondent success rates (Complainants win between 80 and 90 percent of the
disputes). Regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists,
especially legalists, believe more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they
point to instances of member recalcitrance to implement rulings as a serious problem.
This article posits that such attempts to strengthen compliance are ill-advised. After
discussing prior empirical analyses of WTO adjudication involving primary rights
and obligations under the WTO agreements (i.e., substantive adjudication), this
article expands the empirical study into compliance disputes. It finds that
"enforcement" proceedings do protect the pro-free trade interests so overwhelmingly
supported in substantive adjudication. Because that is the case, this article
investigates the extent to which current levels of noncompliance might constitute a
threat to this regime, and theorizes that the observed level is not only acceptable but a
necessary feature of the system. I conclude by arguing that compliance-related issues
must be viewed in a broader perspective that transcends narrow legalistic views and
accounts for the multifaceted interests of, and differences among, WTO members.
(JEL: K 33, K 41)
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Introduction†
Mainstream international trade law scholars characterize the WTO dispute
settlement system's handling of cases as one of the most striking successes of the postUruguay Round legacy.1 To them, judicialization of trade disputes and the "apt" work
of WTO adjudicators in handling this caseload have increased the normative strength of
the negotiated agreements and furthered the status of international trade as a rules-based
regime. This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by empirical scholarship
that shows a high disparity between Complainant and Respondent success rates
(Complainants win between 80 to 90 percent of the disputes) in WTO litigation.2 The
more recent empirical study eliminated case docket differences (e.g., case subject
matter, party status, income level and other litigant-specific characteristics), case
selection and other alternative hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence.
It theorized that this discrepancy in success rates is the result of a systematic, one-sided
readiness on the part of WTO adjudicators to construe WTO texts as creating
obligations against Respondents, often in disregard of members' reserved regulatory
competencies and the negotiated standards of review.3

†

The author is grateful to __________and ________ for their helpful suggestions, which
greatly assisted the author's research. Melissa Palmer provided excellent research assistance.
This article was presented at the ASIL – International Law Group Biennial Conference at the
University of Minnesota Law School (November 18-20, 2010).
1

See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996).
2

See, e.g., John Maton & Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal
Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 317
(2007) (praising the DSB system as "independent from Member State influence."); Juscelino
F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule
Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383, 439 (2009) (faulting the DSB system for
embracing an expansive form of judicial lawmaking that "consistently construes WTO law
against Respondents" in substantive adjudication).
3

Id. at 429.
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Still, regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists believe
more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they point to instances of member
recalcitrance to implement DSB recommendations as a serious problem.4 To this end,
they propose reforms ranging from allowing for collective sanctions through
multilateral enforcement to tightening enforcement deadlines so as to increase the
incentives for compliance. This article posits that such attempts to strengthen
compliance are ill-advised. First, the case for a compliance problem is weak:
suspension of concessions seldom occurs, as Respondents tend to comply after losing
the underlying case or following defeat in a compliance case. Furthermore, the rare
instances of noncompliance after litigation has run its full course do not deprive
successful Complainants of all they can expect to gain from litigating. Beyond
allowing for the redress of grievances, litigation can also give Complainants advantages
in ongoing trade negotiations.5 Second, enforcement-enhancing proposals are premised
on the notion that giving more power to third-parties charged with resolving disputes
and monitoring enforcement will necessarily strengthen the normative obligations
already prescribed in the trade agreements. This view naïvely assumes members can be
made to comply even when compliance is contrary to their own interests. Finally, lessthan-perfect compliance constitutes no threat to the trade regime. Rather, it is an
essential escape valve in a system driven by increasing judicialization and adjudicator
activism. Viewed in this more flexible perspective, noncompliance appears as a
method of last resort, accommodating members' strong political and economic interests
as they can no longer count on the diplomatic flexibility of the previous GATT system.
Accordingly, instead of threatening the trade system's normativity, such rare deviations
allow its continued operation while its rules, as interpreted through bilateral litigation,
cannot properly accommodate certain losing parties' strong political economy
constraints nor defer to the notable power asymmetries in the multilateral system.
Part I of this article outlines the general features of the WTO dispute settlement
system and discusses how prior empirical analyses of adjudication have dealt with the
uniform pattern of Complainant success. Because neither case, litigant or productspecific differences in disputes can account for the disparity in
4

See William J. Davey, Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been
Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?, in THE WTO IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN
ASIA 98 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al ., 2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and
Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2000).
5

See USDA: Brazil Seeks GSM 102 Changes To At Least Match Doha Draft Text, Inside
U.S. Trade World Trade Online (Apr. 30, 2010), available at www.insidetrade.com (last
accessed Jun. 17, 2010) (describing how Brazil is currently using its victory in the Cotton
dispute and its right to retaliate against the US to either eliminate this WTO-incompatible
subsidy program "or at least change it to reflect the latest Doha round agriculture draft
modalities text.") and LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT 321 (John H. Jackson et.al, eds., 5th ed. 2008) (stating that "WTO
members may be tempted to use the dispute settlement system to try to achieve what has
eluded them in negotiations.").

-3-

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

DRAFT OF FEB. 3, 2010 (SC)

Complainant/Respondent win rates, I discuss a number of competing theories (e.g.,
Respondent protectionism, settlement restraint effect, etc.) and explain why, so far,
biased rule development seems to provide the most compelling explanation for this
discrepancy. Part II expands the empirical analysis into compliance disputes and
investigates whether this type of "enforcement" adjudication protects the pro-free trade
interests so overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication. After detecting that
is the case, I surmise that WTO adjudication is self-consistent, even if WTO
adjudicators do not exhibit any outright bias in compliance cases, as, at that stage, mere
unbiased application of rules will protect prior pro-free trade results. Part III
investigates the extent to which noncompliance might constitute a threat to this regime,
as prior literature has suggested, and explains the current level of noncompliance is a
necessary feature of the international trade system. It also explains why proposals
calling for increased WTO enforcement abilities are unlikely to improve compliance
and posits that a minimum level of noncompliance affords flexibility to an increasingly
judicialized and activist dispute settlement system. The article concludes by arguing
that compliance-related issues must be viewed in a broader perspective that transcends
narrow legalistic views of the trade regime and accounts for the multifaceted interests
of, and differences among, WTO members.
I.

The Structure and Operation of Substantive Adjudication
A.

Background on the WTO Dispute Resolution System

To enable members to protect their bargained-for trade concessions (e.g.,
tariff reductions, elimination of non-tariff barriers, market access) against traderestrictive measures, the WTO agreements provide a mechanism of binding dispute
settlement.6 WTO panels and the Appellate Body deliberate and make rulings on
disputes submitted by aggrieved members under the supervision of the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB"). Specifically, where either a panel or the Appellate Body
finds that a challenged member's measure "impairs or nullifies" another member's
"benefits accruing" under one of the "covered agreements," the adjudicator prepares a
final report, and then submits it to the DSB for formal adoption.7 Once the DSB
meets, it must adopt the report unless, by consensus, it decides against adoption.8
This adoption-by-default rule represents a major departure from the former
GATT system, which required a positive consensus by all parties, including
6

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, arts. 1(1),
7(2), 22(3), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU]. By the express language of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") 1994 Article 1(a), the provisions of GATT remain effective "as rectified, amended
or modified by the terms of the" more recent WTO agreements. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
7

See id. at art. XXIII; DSU at arts. 16(4) and 17(14).

8

Id.
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Respondents, before adoption of a report. Significantly, because violators can no
longer rely on this particular legal safeguard to block enforcement, the new WTO
regime effectively abolished the formal "veto" in trade disputes. That, to date, no
report has been blocked9 is as much a direct result of the operation of the new reverse
consensus rule as it is proof of how the system has become increasingly judicialized,
i.e., no longer dependent on final diplomatic negotiations among the affected parties.
Suffice it to say that now the losing Respondent must bring its violating measure(s)
into conformity with the prior ruling or face the prospect of lawful retaliation by its
opponent (e.g., increase tariffs, suspension of intellectual property royalty payments,
etc.) by an amount equivalent to the cost of the violation.10 Whether the end of report
blocking and the ensuing judicialization did effectively remove the veto from the
trade system is a question I examine later.
B.

The Legal Structure of WTO Substantive Disputes

By "substantive disputes," I mean disagreements as to the effective operation
of the various substantive norms in the WTO Agreements, as distinguished from
disagreements as to whether a defeated Respondent has satisfactorily adopted
measures to comply with a prior report or judgment. This distinction is important not
because there is intrinsic value in divining any ontological substance/procedure
demarcation criterion in WTO law. Rather, it is useful because whether adjudication
patterns observed in substantive litigation are also observed in compliance litigation
can help one ascertain whether the WTO adjudicatory system ensures that successful
litigants in one stage also carry their victories to the other stage, when compliance is
the issue. Therefore, only by looking at both types of litigation can one make
empirical statements about whether WTO adjudication is outcome-consistent,
regardless of party status (i.e., aggrieved party or alleged violator), the posture in
which one might appear in a case (i.e., Complainant or Respondent) or the original
subject matter of the dispute (i.e., the agreement under which it arose).
Among the substantive norms used to gauge whether a measure amounts to a
"nullification" of another member's rights—thus giving rise to a substantive dispute—
the most important are the most-favored-nation ("MFN") principle, the national
treatment or non-discrimination principle, and the general prohibition against
quantitative (i.e., nontariff) measures. These norms generally prohibit discrimination
among goods and services imported from or provided by any member and proscribe
discrepancies in the treatment of foreign and domestic goods and services. Such
broad requirements are subject to qualified exceptions. Specifically, members have
retained the GATT-based right to apply offsetting tariffs to "dumped"11 or
9

See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, Appellate Body
Reports, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (last visited July 6,
2010).
10

DSU at art. 22(2).

11

Generally, "dumping" refers to the practice of selling products in the importing market
at prices lower than their "normal value" (e.g., home market price, where available). See
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
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impermissibly subsidized products that cause material injury to domestic producers.12
A set of strong public policy exceptions was also preserved from the GATT years.
Among these exceptions are measures deemed necessary to protect public morals,13
measures relating to conservation of natural resources,14 and emergency trade
restrictions that safeguard a member's balance of payments.15 In sum, this framework
of general rules and exceptions form the bulk of substantive norms that constitute the
most frequent grounds for bringing and defending against WTO substantive cases, the
object of the empirical analyses to which I now turn.
C.

Empirical Analyses of Substantive Case Decisions16
1.

On Avoiding the Elephant in the Room

Scholarship on WTO dispute settlement is as extensive as it is varied in its
assessment of the system's overall performance and its methods of inquiry. I focus
primarily on empirical studies because they reveal a curious phenomenon: although
analyses of case outcomes repeatedly show a high rate of Complainant success
(generally ranging from 80 percent to the high 90s), there is very little discussion,
much less a developed consensus, on what this might mean. For example, Hudec
analyzed GATT dispute outcomes from 1948 to 1989.17 He found that the GATT
dispute settlement procedure, the precursor to the current WTO system, resolved a
high percentage of disputes in favor of Complainants (88 percent overall).18 Nowhere
does he attempt to provide an explanation for the high Complainant win rate, except
when he discusses antidumping ("AD") and countervailing duty ("CVD") cases.
Specifically, Hudec posits that "the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD criteria"
and "the ascension of AD/CVD measures to a place of importance in national trade
policy might . . . be a sign of other, deeper tendencies toward noncompliant

Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter AD Agreement].
12

See GATT 1994 at art. VI; AD Agreement at art. 3; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 5, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
1867 U.N.T.S. 14, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]
13

GATT 1994 at art. XX(a).

14

Id. at art. XX(g).

15

Id. at arts. V, XII.

16

Unfortunately, all prior empirical studies of WTO litigation (except Colares') are based
on datasets that do not distinguish between substantive and compliance disputes. Because
overall results in all studies are quite similar, this distinction, though important for purposes
of Part II, will not be considered here.
17

See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273 (1993).
18

See id. at 353.
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behavior."19 Unfortunately, other than an expression of his ideological opposition to
these types of laws, Hudec's explanation limits itself to a particular set of cases and
offers merely a conclusory assertion that Respondents lost because they are
protectionists. That GATT & WTO Respondent and Complainant win rates have
diverged over time, when the positive theory of litigation suggests they should
converge at some point,20 apparently has not prompted much reflection beyond the
traditional "Respondent qua protectionist" fall back narrative. Indeed, this puzzle
remained unaddressed until quite recently.
Other empirical studies have been more ambitious in that they attempt to test
hypotheses about the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system, going beyond
mere description of the main variables of litigation. Although not squarely
addressing the question of concern here, these studies offer important theoretical
explanations about phenomena related to the evolution of the WTO adjudicatory
system. For instance, Guzman and Simmons look at settlement activity in WTO
litigation and find that transaction costs, such as domestic political economy
constraints, members' inability to make deals involving transfers in unrelated areas
and members' general reluctance to procure settlement via cash payments, reduce the
scope of settlement activity in WTO adjudication.21 They also raise an important
theoretical issue: the operation of the MFN principle might limit members'
willingness to enter into settlements because they hesitate to offer concessions that
"may have to be granted to every WTO member state."22 This insight is significant
because if, due to some feature of the WTO system's design, members face significant
settlement constraints, high Complainant win rates might be attributed to
Respondents' inability to settle. Similarly, despite its tremendous significance, this
settlement-limitation effect has not received the attention it deserves (I return to this
point later).
With a similar focus on settlement activity, Busch and Reinhardt find that
Complainants are more likely to obtain better concessions in the consultations (i.e.,
pre-litigation) stage than later. They posit that the onset of full blown litigation
increases domestic pressures in favor of the challenged trade restrictive measure and,
thus, reduces the incentives for settlement.23 Whether the MFN principle does in fact
constrain settlement activity or whether the start of actual litigation reduces the size
19

See id. at 355.

20

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1984). Specifically, the theory suggests that, absent information and
stake asymmetries, parties tend to adjust their taste for litigation based on signals emanating
from the litigation environment, with stronger cases settling rather than going to full
adjudication.
21

See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210-11 (2002).
22

See id. at 210.

23

See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 162-63 (2000).
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of settlements, none of these articles say much about how the settlement rate is likely
to affect the Complainant and Respondent litigation calculus and likelihood of
success.24
2.

The Dominant Narrative's Blind Spot

As discussed, most empirical analyses of WTO litigation either do not
measure or fail to fully address the continuing success disparity between
Complainants and Respondents.25 Despite occasionally noting the empirical
regularity in Complainants very high win rate, the empirical literature's remarkable
fascination with the increasing judicialization of the WTO system and its casual
adoption of received "Respondent-qua-protectionist" narratives contributes to an
astonishing lack of reflection on the reasons for such an important asymmetry in the
system. As an example, take the rarely questioned received view that a dispute
resolution system predicated on free trade exists to correct the potential politicallymotivated "tilt" of national agencies in favor of trade restrictive measures that put
national trade policy in direct collision with international commitments.26 Following
this view, many commentators surmise, as Hudec and others do, that the high rate of
national agency loss at the WTO (reflected in Respondents' very low win rate) is a
mere direct result of the WTO adjudicatory system doing what it is supposed to do:
reversing the effects of national agency protectionist bias.27

24

But see Colares, supra note 2 at 413-16.

25

See, e.g., HUDEC, supra note 17 at 355 (discussing the growth in the use of the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism by all parties); William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement
System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 18 (2005)(focusing solely on the success
of the "major users" of the WTO dispute settlement system when they appear as
Complainants); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the U.S. Support International Tribunals? The Case
of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 322 (Cesare Romano ed., 2009) (arguing that, as a
Complainant, the US "has been successful in virtually all of the cases it has pursued
seriously," and explaining that the US generally complies when it loses because the DSB and
the WTO rule-based system maximize US economic interests); and Marc L. Busch et al.,
Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the
WTO 1 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue
Paper No. 2, 2008) (theorizing that LDCs are less likely to bring claims at the WTO due to a
weaker legal capacity).
26

See, e.g., GARY HORLICK, WTO & NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
SELECTED ESSAYS ON ANTIDUMPING, SUBSIDIES & OTHER MEASURES 15 (2003); Judith
Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American
"Unfair" Trade Laws, 50 INT’L ORG. 541 (1996); John M. Mercury, Chapter 19 of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95: A Check on Administered
Protection?, 15 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 525 (1995); Arun Venkataraman, Note, Binational
Panels and Multilateral Negotiations: A Two-Track Approach to Limiting Contingent
Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 533, 578-79 (1999).
27

See, JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
148 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (proposing that as bound tariffs decline, states have an
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However, reliance on such a broad agency capture argument is problematic.
For while agency capture might result from domestic producers' political mobilization
to obtain trade protection, the same argument can be used to demonstrate that it is at
least equally plausible that foreign producers, in alliance with import-consuming
industries, are also able to engage in similar rent-seeking efforts, since the costs that
duties imposed on them may exceed the benefits that domestic producers might
derive from them. In fact, many US administrative proceedings, especially in the
AD/CVD area, involve at least as concentrated downstream US consuming industries
as they involve US producers seeking trade barriers (e.g., softwood lumber, steel,
wheat, pork, etc.). As members of highly integrated industries in vertical production
chains, foreign producers and domestic importing interests may actually present
better candidates for collective action. Although not all agencies behave alike, at a
minimum, one must view agency action as reflecting more than just domestic
producers' rent-seeking efforts.
While the broader empirical question of whether national agencies have been
faithful to the intent of the WTO agreements when applying national law lies outside
the scope of this article, one must acknowledge that high Complainant success rates
and their corollary, high rates of agency loss, are hardly direct evidence of bias
correction, much less a confirmation that national trade restricting measures are
protectionist. The empirical literature's tendency to look favorably at WTO litigation
is at least partly attributable to its reliance on half-thought, outdated narratives that
view this adjudicatory system as merely engaged in bias correction; a view that has
not received the reflection it deserves. Indeed, regardless of one's subjective views on
the national agency bias question, whether WTO adjudication's high rate of
Complainant success and agency loss is a response to captured agency
decisionmaking should be openly investigated and discussed, not assumed away as
commentators rush to look at other presumably more testable hypotheses.
3.

Complainant and Respondent Success Rate Asymmetry:
The Search for an Answer

Two studies have sought to explain Complainants' overall high success rate in
WTO adjudication and, for this reason, stand apart. Maton & Maton analyze all
WTO disputes through 2004 and find that Complainants win 81.9 percent of panel
rulings.28 They also determine that neither Complainants' economic power, previous
use of the DSB, nor the presence of third-party litigants can account for
Complainants' win rate.29 In light of these results, Maton & Maton refute prior
anecdotal studies30 that suggested WTO adjudicators are influenced by extra-legal
pressures from more powerful members.31 In concluding that their findings
incentive to cheat "by inventing . . . nontariff barriers that [are] fiendishly obscure," thus
perpetuating the received view that national agencies are but agents of protectionism).
28

Maton & Maton, supra note 2 at 328.

29

Id. at 325-28.

30

Id. at 320-21.

31

Id. at 333.
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demonstrate WTO adjudicators "are immune from such pressures," 32 the authors, as
others before them, pass on the opportunity to further investigate or theorize on their
other major finding: the Complainant/Respondent success asymmetry.
a.

Why Immunity from Member Influence Matters

Admittedly, Maton & Maton's finding that WTO adjudicators are not sensitive
to Complainants' economic power is relevant as far as the win rate asymmetry is
concerned: it eliminates one major source of bias from consideration. Yet, the
absence of favoritism toward great economic powers, such as the US, EU and Japan,
cannot prove that WTO adjudication is "immune" from every source of bias. Because
WTO adjudication is essentially a "bilateral means" of solving trade disputes in a
multilateral system,33 observing a few major countries' success rates as Complainants
could hardly provide the ultimate test for detecting all sources of bias. Arguably, any
eventual tilt in the system is much more likely to express itself in the triumph of one
version of multilateralism over another (e.g., adopting an activist liberal view of trade
vs. adopting a jurisprudence that balances free trade against legitimate trade
restrictions) rather than in the adoption of one or a few members' unilateral
preferences. Indeed, powerful member influence, though undeniable, is significantly
diluted in an organization with 153 members (as of July 2008).34
Thus, besides coding for winners and losers, to find any bias in the WTO
adjudicatory system, one would have to look beyond the identity of the litigant (i.e.,
Country A or Country B) to the posture in which a litigant is appearing (i.e.,
Complainant or Respondent), and the arguments each is making under WTO law.
For example, if it turns out that the same countries exhibiting high rates of success as
Complainants also have low rates of success as Respondents, then one might be
justified not only to discard bias for or against such countries—as Maton & Maton
do—but also wonder if there is a bias against all Respondents. Yet, before one could
make an argument for bias, one should investigate whether other variables, such as
case subject matter, differences in standards of review or type of product involved,
might explain such discrepancy. For it is possible that the same multilateral concerns
that gave rise to differences among agreements might account for such disparities.
Should that be the case, rather than being biased against Respondents, adjudicators
might merely be adjusting their decisions to account for such agreement-based
variations. Finally, if one finds that none of these variables can account for the
consistently high Complainant success rate, then one might verify whether
adjudicators' adoption of certain interpretive positions varies with respect to the
posture of the litigant and the argument it makes. Only in the latter case can an
argument for bias be made. Although Maton & Maton do not venture into
formulating or rejecting such alternative explanations, they suggest that further

32

Id. at 333.

33

See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 135.

34

See Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
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research, incorporating a wider range of variables, would be necessary to more fully
understand WTO adjudication.35
b.

The Case for Biased Rule Development

Colares accepted Maton & Maton's suggestion, used a more comprehensive
database that both included more recent cases (through September 2007) and coded
for the usual variables (e.g., Income Level, Third-Party Involvement, etc.) as well as a
number of additional variables (e.g., Case Type, Party Identity, Product Type, etc.).36
One illustration: when considering the agreements under which disputes arose (coded
under the "Case Type" variable), Colares hypothesized that the specific, more agencydeferential standard of review in the AD Agreement should lead to lower
Complainant success rates in AD cases than the general, less deferential "objective
assessment" standard of review applicable to disputes arising under other
agreements.37 He found that despite the agency-friendly, Chevron-like level of
deference under the AD agreement,38 Respondent win rates were actually lower (9
percent) in AD cases than in any other type of dispute.39
After finding that Complainants' success rates remained high (i.e., 80 percent
and above) regardless of differences in categories of cases and litigants considered,
Colares discussed why none of the alternative empirical explanations, such as case
selection, stake and information asymmetries and the potential MFN settlementconstraint effect, could account for Complainants' stellar litigation performance.40 In
fact, because neither case-specific distinctions, litigant-based variations nor
alternative explanations could explain Complainant success and the same countries
exhibiting high rates of success as Complainants also had low rates of success as
Respondents, Colares pondered the possibility of a bias against all Respondents.41
This bias, defined as "the result of a process of authoritative normative evolution . . .
that expresse[s] itself with a tilt favoring Complainants,"42 if detected in WTO
decision patterns, could explain Complainants' pervasive success in every type of
WTO substantive dispute.
To verify the existence such pro-Complainant decisional patterns, Colares
looked closely at two sets of cases: the first ten AD disputes, where adjudicators
35

Maton & Maton, supra note 2 at 333-34.

36

Colares, supra note 2 at 402-12.

37

DSU at art. 11.

38

See AD Agreement at art. 17(6) (stating that a national measure will be in conformity
with the Agreement if it rests upon a permissible interpretation of law and that agencies' fact
findings will not be disturbed, even when "the panel might have reached a different
conclusion," so long as they are "unbiased and objective").
39

Colares, supra note 2 at 403.

40

Id. at 412-22.

41

Id. at 422.

42

Id.
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would presumably explain their views on the AD Agreement's more agency
deferential standard of review; and disputes involving the use of declarations arising
under different agreements (e.g., AD, GATT, SCM and the Agreement on
Government Procurement43).44 He explains the choice of these cases on two separate
grounds. First, the AD cases not only have important precedential value as early
cases, but also contain the WTO adjudicators' earliest and most considered
justification for striking down agencies' decisions under the most pro-agency
standard.45 Indeed, in light of the high rate of agency reversal in these disputes, this
would be the ideal setting in which to verify the occurrence of bias. Second, the cases
involving declarations span different areas under WTO law, thus providing a broader
context in which to detect bias. Moreover, in these cases, Respondents and
Complainants argued for and against giving binding effect to declarations, and WTO
adjudicators made seemingly irreconcilable rulings, sometimes construing
declarations as binding, other times construing them as merely aspirational.46 Should
decisions to give declarations one effect or the other vary with respect to the posture
in which a litigant appears, one would not only reconcile these rulings, but argue bias
is at least a plausible explanation, since declarations embody the intent of negotiators
during the same round of negotiations, employ similar language and, thus,
presumably deserve the same treatment.
In both sets of cases, Colares identifies two central tendencies: hollowing out
Respondents' rights under the agreements (e.g., by conflating the AD and DSU
standards of review into an amorphous de novo standard, by giving no effect to
declarations that favor Respondents, etc.) and expanding the scope of Respondents'
obligations beyond the negotiated agreements (e.g., by creating extraneous, ad hoc
tests to gauge Respondents' conduct during investigations, by finding an obligation to
engage in multilateral negotiations before implementing regulations where none
previously existed, etc.).47 He argues that, combined, these decisions have promoted
trade liberalization at the expense of the reservations members made during
negotiations, effectively reducing Respondents' regulatory discretion.48 While,
legally, the result is a jurisprudence that "clarifies the existing provisions of the
agreements consistently in one direction"49 (i.e., in favor of Complainants),
politically, the practical consequence is the continuous "transfer of decisional power"
away from members to a select few WTO adjudicators.50 This creation of
43

Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GPA].
44

Colares, supra note 2 at 423-24, 429-30.

45

Id. at429-30.

46

Id. at 430-35.

47

Id. at 436.

48

Id.

49

Id. (citation omitted).

50

Id. at 437.
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nonnegotiated obligations under the guise of interpreting the negotiated agreements,
Colares argues, goes beyond the scope of the original authorization to act as neutral
third parties in disputes involving endogenously incomplete contracts.51 In sum,
Colares faults WTO adjudicators not for completing the "optimally incomplete" WTO
agreements, but for completing them consistently against Respondents.52
That WTO adjudicators' interpretive positions across a broad range of disputes
vary with respect to the posture and argument of the litigant explains why focusing on
the identity of particular winners and losers would not reveal the tangible bias in the
system. Yet, case-transcending trends do exist, can account for the systematic proComplainant win rate and, more importantly, can explain the puzzling lack of
convergence in Complainant and Respondent success rates, even after a decade and a
half of operation.53
c.

Challenges to Biased Rule Development

If case selection, information asymmetry and stake asymmetry cannot account
for the sustained pattern of Complainant success, as Colares claims,54 then bias is a
serious contender among theories that would explain why WTO adjudication
outcomes deviate from the positive theory of litigation's prediction that Complainants
and Respondents must experience a roughly equivalent share of litigation success.
One still has to consider the potential explanatory power of a few additional
theoretical rivals: the familiar "Respondent qua protectionist" argument, the
"settlement-restraint" effect and the "low volume of filings" paradox.
i.

The Respondent qua Protectionist Argument

As the most commonly advanced explanation for the sustained pattern of
Complainant success in dispute resolution,55 the protectionist argument is overbroad
in its assumption that Respondents are always motivated by protectionist pressures,
never acting to vindicate legitimate, WTO-compliant regulatory policy. Remarkably,
protectionism alone cannot fully explain why WTO adjudicators would develop an
AD jurisprudence that disregards the more deferential AD standard of review if they
are merely reacting against cheating.56 If that were true, members would simply not
51

Id.

52

Id. at 397 (citation omitted).

53

The data in this article is current through September 2009 and confirms Colares' prior
results. Compare id. at 419-422 with infra Part II.B.3.
54

Colares, supra note 2 at 412-13, 416-17 (citation omitted).

55

See generally HORLICK, supra note 26 at 15; Goldstein, supra note 26; Mercury, supra
note 26; HUDEC, supra note 17; J. Michael Finger & Tracey Murray, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Enforcement in the United States in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS
AND WHO GETS HURT?, 241 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993).
56

See, e.g., Colares, supra note 2 at 423-29 (demonstrating how the Egypt-Steel Rebar
panel, in applying the DSU "objective assessment" standard of review (Art. 11)
"simultaneously" with the AD standard (Art. 17.6(i)), engaged in a more intrusive review of
the agency's fact-finding than the AD standard authorizes).
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meet the standard, no matter how leniently or restrictively construed. Similarly,
agency protectionism cannot reconcile rulings that give different effect to
declarations, shifting their legal status according to the particular interests advanced
by Complainants while restraining otherwise legitimate agency action.57 In sum, the
result is a pattern of decisions that systematically favors Complainants not because
adjudicators are correcting national agency protectionism, but because adjudicators
have adopted a result-driven, teleological version of free trade that requires such
interpretive contortions.
ii.

The Settlement-Restraint Effect

A more serious competitor to the bias theory would be the existence of
structural constraints on Respondents' ability to settle disputes. As discussed earlier,
Guzman & Simmons suggest that the MFN principle might constrain settlement
activity because offering concessions in one dispute, a prerequisite for any settlement,
triggers the obligation to extend similar concessions to all other WTO members.58
Arguably, in light of the MFN requirement, Respondents would naturally hesitate to
offer concessions, opting instead for full adjudication of even weak cases, which, in
turn, would explain their higher than expected, non-converging rate of loss. If this
argument is well founded, Colares' bias theory would be harder to support, for even in
unbiased adjudication, Respondents' win rates could not converge with Complainants'
if Respondents are consistently adjudicating weak cases. However, this settlementrestraint effect is theoretically flawed and can be refuted empirically. While
theoretically bound by the MFN requirement, WTO members are exempt from
extending concessions to all other members when they are already in or enter into
Preferential Trade Agreements ("PTAs"), a fundamental exception to the MFN
principle.59 Although one would not argue that members enter into PTAs solely for
this particular reason, their existence frees members from the MFN's unconditional
multilateral reciprocation requirement, thus attenuating any the settlementconstraining effect the operation of this principle might cause.
The MFN thesis also fails empirically. Colares tested its plausibility by
separately regressing Respondents' trade-to-GDP ratios and import-to-GDP ratios
against their settlement rates. If the MFN principle has a settlement-constraining
effect, Colares hypothesized, this effect will increase as Respondents' trade
dependence increases. Specifically, the higher a Respondent's trade-to-GDP or
import-to-GDP ratio is, the less likely it is to settle, because any concession granted
has a comparatively larger impact on its economy.60 Because neither of these
regression models, nor their individual regressors, were statistically significant (.05
probability level), Colares refuted the hypothesis that Respondents' concerns over the
57

See, e.g., id. at 430-35 (comparing the interpretation of a pro-Respondent declaration as
merely aspirational in US–Leaded Bar with the interpretation of a pro-Complainant
declaration as effectively binding in US–Shrimp/Turtle).
58

See Guzman & Simmons, supra note 21 at 210 and GATT 1994 at art. I.

59

Id. at art. XXIV.

60

Colares, supra note 2 at 414-15.
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potential economic impact of concessions, the MFN effect, depresses the settlement
rate. The lack of empirical support for an MFN-based settlement-constraining effect,
besides providing indirect support to the idea that there are flexible ways around the
MFN principle, also conforms to earlier findings of substantial settlement activity in
GATT/WTO litigation.61 Because the MFN thesis has clear theoretical limitations
and is contradicted by empirical evidence, the high rate of Respondent losses is not
the product of having to litigate weak cases that cannot be settled. This does not
mean that Respondents litigate only strong cases, it merely demonstrates that MFN
pressures cannot account for the lack of win rate convergence.
iii.

The Low Volume of Filings Paradox

Finally, one may counter that if the high rate of Complainant success is the
result of bias, then it would be difficult to explain the paradoxically small number of
disputes adjudicated so far (117 adopted reports as of September 2009). That rational
Complainants would file cases seriatim to maximize utility from biased adjudication
is hardly the necessary result, however. In a multilateral system, high success in
bilateral litigation will not necessarily lead to more filings if Complainants realize
that every trade liberalizing decision creates precedent that further restricts the
universe of regulatory choices they may want to adopt in the future. Viewed in this
way, appearing before a court that is more than willing to restrain members' ability to
regulate trade can produce an interesting form of "winner's curse," and would thus
explain why a potential biased adjudicator might not be so attractive, even to the
favored litigant. In fact, in this system, the most litigious members have also been the
most frequent Respondents and the latter experience might explain their caution to
use a system that will further reduce their discretion as sovereign states. Plausibly,
their inability to achieve a similar level of success as Complainants when appearing
in the opposite posture has apparently served them well.
d.

Implications of Biased Rule Development

The bias theory, if correct, would fill a significant gap in the empirical
literature on WTO adjudication, a gap that, to date, has not been closed by any
serious, overarching explanation for the existence of a strikingly uniform pattern of
Complainant success, regardless of case, litigant or product-specific differences in
disputes. A pro-Complainant bias would imply that, far from optimally balancing the
value of trade liberalization against the interest in regulatory diversity—a balance
members struck by negotiating terms intended to safeguard "the values and norms

61

See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 23 at 158-59 (stating that "fully three-fifths of all
disputes end prior to a panel ruling, and most of these without a request for a panel even
being made."). It should be noted that their methodology for counting cases differs from
Colares'. Unlike Busch & Reinhardt, who count cases from the moment a request for
consultations is made (i.e., including the pre-litigation stage), Colares counts only cases in
which a panel is requested. This explains why Colares finds a much lower rate of settlement
(about 30 percent). See Colares, supra note 2 at 413. As discussed infra Part II.B.3, this
difference is quite important in the discussion regarding case selection.
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that shape"62 their different societies (e.g., GATT, art. XX)—WTO adjudicators have
adopted an ambitious judicial philosophy that teleologically advances a liberal view
of trade and deviates from the considered original will of the WTO members.
This finding has many other serious implications, some of which Colares
discussed (e.g., displacement of members' legitimate policy choices, impact on
current trade negotiations, etc.),63 but, more importantly, it may explain why some
powerful members, in the absence of a formal veto, have occasionally delayed
compliance or refused to comply with certain DSB judgments. After all, if the
involvement of third parties does not lead to consistently neutral verdicts, then
dispute resolution is no longer superior to bilateral normal diplomatic channels or,
depending on the stakes involved, occasional noncompliance,64 the topic to which I
now turn.
II.

The Legal Structure and Role of Compliance Adjudication
A.

General Remarks

As previously explained (see Part I.A.), following DSB adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report, the offending country must eliminate the violating measure
and bring its practices into compliance with the ruling.65 Members must comply
within a "reasonable time,"66 as failure to do so triggers the possibility of suspension
of concessions (i.e., retaliation) on the part of the prevailing member.67 When it is
impractical for a Member to comply immediately, members may resort to binding
arbitration to determine the "reasonable period of time" for compliance ("Article
21(3)(c) Arbitration").68 Where there is disagreement regarding whether a member
has complied with the panel or AB's recommendations, the DSB designates, when
possible, the original panel (i.e., the panel that decided the substantive case) to settle
such disputes ("Article 21(5) Review").69 Should the original Complainant also
prevail in the latter type of dispute, it may request compensation (e.g., further tariff
concessions, increased market access, etc.) in lieu of suspending concessions against
the offending member.70 Finally, when disputes over the level or method of
retaliation arise, members shall submit such disputes to arbitration ("Article 22(6)
Arbitration"), which shall also "be carried out by the original panel," if these
62

Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT'S NEW? 196, 199
(Michael M. Weinstein ed. 2005).
63

Colares, supra note 2 at 435-38.

64

See Andrew Guzman, Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 307-08 (2002).
65

DSU at art. 23(2)(a).

66

Id. at art. 22(1).

67

See id. at art. 22.

68

Id. at art 21(3)(c).

69

See id. at art 21(5).

70

See id. at art. 22(2).

- 16 -

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

DRAFT OF FEB. 3, 2010 (SC)

adjudicators are available.71 In these cases, the arbitrator's jurisdiction is limited to
the amount of nullification or impairment and whether the form of retaliation is
allowed under the agreements; the arbitrator may not revisit previously litigated
issues.72 Because the mere possibility of applying such countermeasures provides a
substantial incentive for compliance, suspension of WTO obligations against the
offending member is generally the exception—members usually comply or offer
some form of compensation.
B.

An Empirical Analysis of Compliance Decisions
1.

A Caveat on the Implications of Posture Reversals

Clearly, compliance disputes involve issues ancillary to, yet not directly
involving, adjudication of WTO substantive rules. Remarkably, previous empirical
scholarship on WTO adjudication tends not to segregate and compare compliance and
substantive adjudication when analyzing the overall operation of the system. Yet, the
issues decided under each type of litigation are not the same. Specifically, whereas
substantive adjudication considers whether members' conduct conforms to their
primary WTO obligations, compliance adjudication considers members' conduct with
respect to a duty of a derived or secondary nature: the duty to comply with WTO
rulings.
This distinction would not matter much if one observed no major
discrepancies in outcomes between these forms of litigation. Even if that proved to
be the case, having a similar outcome profile does not obviate the need to investigate
how each form of litigation might affect Complainants' and Respondents' interests
differently. For example, Complainants in substantive disputes may not be
Complainants in certain compliance disputes. In Article 22(6) "Level of Suspension"
Arbitration, a successful Complainant might appear as a Respondent if the erstwhile
Respondent challenges the amount of retaliation the erstwhile Complainant believes it
can rightfully impose pursuant to its prior victory. In this particular context, the
current Complainant's grievance is the erstwhile Complainant's proposed level of
retaliation, which will only be an impermissible trade restriction if it exceeds the level
of actual nullification or impairment (i.e., overdeterrence). Therefore, the potential
for significant posture reversals blurs the categories of litigants and disturbs the
conventional perception of the interests litigants represent. As the example
illustrates, traditional perceptions of erstwhile Complainants as favoring trade
liberalization and erstwhile Respondents as wishing to restrict trade are no longer
accurate and must be abandoned.
Given this possibility, posture reversals might call into question any
generalizations about the relative success of Complainants in WTO adjudication that
do not account for the different interests that Complainants and Respondents may
represent in different litigation contexts. Thus, if WTO adjudication is indeed biased
towards a particular version of free trade that produces a systematic pattern of
Complainant wins in substantive cases, that bias is not likely to manifest itself in
71

Id. at art. 22(6).

72

See id. at art. 22(7).
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favor of Complainants when they no longer defend the pro-free trade argument at the
compliance stage. This caveat leads to two insights: the first somewhat trivial, the
second a bit more surprising. First, because a bias in favor of a particular version of
free trade expresses itself in the vindication of that interest, not in the success of the
litigant who may have originally spoken for it, compliance outcomes need not be as
systematically pro-Complainant as substantive outcomes. A "litigant reversal" effect,
the result of possible shifts in Complainant and Respondent interests at the
compliance stage will disturb the systematic pattern of high Complainant wins in
substantive adjudication. Second, since mere unbiased application of compliance
rules is enough to protect the prior extremely pro-free trade results achieved in
substantive litigation, WTO adjudicators need not exhibit any bias in compliance
litigation: ensuring the enforcement of prior judgments is all that it takes. If these two
trends are observed, one should be able to conclude that WTO adjudication is
unsurprisingly self-consistent, even if biased.
2.

Data and Methods
a.

Defining a Compliance Case

For purposes of this study, a "compliance case" is a dispute in which a WTO
member challenges another member's conduct in light of its duty to comply with, or
its rights under, a prior WTO ruling. These disputes occur some time after the DSB
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report and are primarily concerned with
enforcement. Compliance adjudication involves the three major disputes defined in
Part II.A., i.e., Article 21(3)(c) "Reasonable Time" Arbitration; Article 21(5)
"Conformity" Review; and Article 22(6) "Level of Suspension" Arbitration. As
usual, data on such adjudication was collected from the WTO case database.73
b.

Determining Compliance Case Outcomes

A compliance case is deemed "final" when the DSB either adopts panel or
Appellate Body reports following Article 21(5) Reviews or approves the results from
Article 21(3)(c) and Article 22(6) Arbitrations. A "settled" compliance case is any
case in which: (1) the complaining party withdraws the panel or arbitration request;
(2) the DSB defers the establishment of a panel74 (usually to due to a request by both
parties); (3) the DSB establishes a panel,75 but there has been no reported activity in
the past three years; (4) the parties formally request that a panel stop its work76 or
agree to postpone arbitration and neither panel nor arbitrator engage in deliberations
for more than twelve months (lapse of authority); or (5) the parties officially notify
the DSB that they have reached an agreed solution in a panel or arbitration
73

See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement,

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm (last visited July
7, 2010).
74

See DSU at art. 6(1).

75

See id. at art. 6.

76

See id. at art. 12(12).
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proceeding.77 Finally, a compliance case is considered "active" when a panel or
arbitration request has been made and the panel, Appellate Body or arbitrator is
currently working toward a formal disposition of the case or the parties have been
engaged in negotiations for 12 months or less. The following table contains a
breakdown of all WTO cases from January1995 through September 2009:
TABLE A: STATUS OF COMPLIANCE CASES
Case Status

Number of Cases

DSB Final Rulings
Settled
Active

61
17
4

Total

81

These 61 final compliance rulings arose out of 42 original substantive disputes.
Given that, to date, a total of 117 DSB substantive reports have been adopted, this
indicates that outright compliance occurred about 64 percent of the time (75 out 117
cases),78 with the remaining decisions (42 cases) eventually leading to some kind of
compliance dispute.
Before providing a more detailed analysis of compliance litigation outcomes,
a few methodological points are in order. First, litigants' success rates are calculated
from the universe of final rulings (settled and active cases are not considered).
Second, as usual, a Complainant is the party that initially files a request for a
compliance proceeding. Because Article 22.6 arbitrations are mostly filed by
erstwhile Respondents seeking lower levels of retaliation (i.e., less trade restriction)
on its exports, the reader should abandon traditional characterizations of litigants and
focus instead on the interests they are likely to represent. Third, a Complainant wins
a case any time it prevails in its major claim, regardless of Respondent's occasional
success in one or more secondary claims. Eliminating the possibility of "mixed"
cases in this manner simplifies the description and analysis of the results without
compromising accuracy.

77

See id. at art. 3(6).

78

Busch and Reinhardt found that the compliance rate increased from 40 percent under
GATT to 66 percent under the WTO. See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, Testing
International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.
HUDEC, 457 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., 2002). Another study,
focusing on the first ten years of WTO dispute settlement, reported an 83% compliance rate.
See William Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 119 (2009).
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Results

A mode of dispute settlement essentially concerned with enforcement,
compliance adjudication focuses on timing to comply, whether compliance has
occurred and whether the proposed level of retaliation correctly reflects the level of
trade impaired. Table B.1 illustrates the distribution of compliance cases. It shows
that the vast majority of compliance adjudications (52 cases or 85.25 percent) never
reach the retaliation stage, as members may only retaliate after obtaining
authorization, which requires filing for arbitration under Article 22(6). Considering
that only nine disputes out of 117 cases (7.69 percent) came to this final stage, one
can conclude, as others have,79 that the WTO dispute settlement system has an
admirable record of compliance. That offending members may at times abuse the
system to gain a temporary trade advantage—first, violating a rule; second, litigating
a potentially meritless case; third, resisting compliance by exploiting procedural
tactics at the compliance stage only to finally comply (or not)—does not belittle this
record. From ad hoc diplomacy to stronger sanctions authorized by third-party
adjudicators, alternative methods of dispute settlement, with varying structures of
incentives, simply cannot ensure countries will act with good faith in all international
economic relations.
TABLE B.1: COMPLIANCE CASES
Compliance Case Types

Number of Compliance Cases

Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration
Article 21(5) Review
Article 22(6) Arbitration
Total

26
26
9
61

Although one should be cautious when interpreting results based on a limited
number of cases, a look at how litigants have performed across compliance case
categories reveals that Complainant Success Rates vary between 56 percent and 92
percent (see Table B.2). Clearly, Complainants' success rates are no longer uniformly
high, as in substantive adjudication. This wide variation in litigants' success rates
might be an early indication that, at least at this stage, adjudication is responsive to
the relative strengths and weaknesses of litigants' cases. Yet, the occurrence of
litigant reversals in compliance adjudication calls for a closer scrutiny of
Complainant win rates.

79

See, e.g., id. at 122; Steve Charnovitz, The Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE
J. INT'L L. 558, 562 (2009); Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WTO Enforcement
Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008). Part III will discuss some of these
authors' assessments and critical views regarding compliance in the WTO system.
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TABLE B.2: COMPLAINANT WIN RATES IN COMPLIANCE CASES
Compliance Case Type

Complainant Success Rate

Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration
Article 21(5) Review
Article 22(6) Arbitration

76.92%
92.31%
55.56%

To examine the potential impact of a litigant reversal effect, I looked at
erstwhile Complainants' performance in compliance adjudication. This required
accounting for all instances in which the Complainant in the underlying WTO dispute
became the Respondent in the compliance proceeding. This happened in four of 26
Article 21(3)(c) arbitrations80 and in eight of nine Article 22(6) arbitrations.81 Again,
as Table B.3 illustrates, erstwhile Complainants' success rates vary widely and differ
significantly from the results observed in substantive adjudication. Yet, more striking
is the sharp separation between what they can accomplish as litigants in Article
21(3)(c) and 21(5) proceedings versus Article 22(6) arbitrations. As expected, this
breakdown of erstwhile Complainants' systematic pattern of wins tracks the shift in
the nature of interests they represent in "level of suspension" arbitrations. At this
stage, due to the nature of WTO remedies (generally retaliation against the
recalcitrant member's exports), erstwhile Complainants are pursuing trade
restrictions. They are now on the opposite side, facing an adjudicatory system that
favors a liberal version of free trade (see Part I discussion on substantive
adjudication) and is invested in ensuring timely and full compliance with prior rulings
(as are erstwhile Complainants), but is clearly weary of approving new trade
restrictions at the level erstwhile Complainants desire.

80

See Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/15 (May 29, 1998); Arbitration Report, Chile–Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/15 (May 23, 2000); Arbitration Report, Canada–Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/13 (Aug. 18, 2000); Arbitration Report,
Chile–Price Brand System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural
Products, WT/DS207/13 (Mar. 17, 2003).
81

See Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 7, 2009); Arbitration Report, European
Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB
(Apr. 9, 1999); Arbitration Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme forAircraft,
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Arbitration Report, United States–Tax Treatment for
"Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002); Arbitration Report, United
States–Antidumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 2004); Arbitration Report,
United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ARB (Aug.
31, 2004); Arbitration Report, Canada–Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003); Arbitration Report, United States–Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB (Aug. 31, 2009).
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TABLE B.3: ERSTWHILE COMPLAINANT WIN RATES IN COMPLIANCE CASES
Compliance Case Type

Erstwhile Complainant Success Rate

Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration
Article 21(5) Review
Article 22(6) Arbitration

92.31%
92.31%
33.33%

One also observes litigant reversals in Article 21(3)(c) Arbitrations, yet no
decline in erstwhile Complainant success rates. This is easy to explain and further
corroborates the earlier expectation that the interest represented, not initial posture,
matters. First, erstwhile Complainants actually won all four cases in which they
appeared as Respondents. Second, and more importantly, erstwhile Complainants'
high success rates in "reasonable time" arbitrations are attributable to their pursuing
timely compliance, not trade restrictions. Finally, they do well because their
opponents (i.e., erstwhile Respondents) are typically resisting compliance by arguing
for a longer interpretation of the reasonable time to comply. Thus, erstwhile
Complainants are unlikely to sue prematurely, as doing so undermines cooperation
and reduces the likelihood of voluntary compliance. Having won in substantive
litigation, a wait-and-see strategy on the part of erstwhile Complainants increases the
chances of compliance or success should subsequent litigation prove necessary.
Meanwhile, erstwhile Respondents know that they can only play for time and
eventually comply or face sanctions.
Viewed in this light, erstwhile Complainants' performance across these case
categories confirms the sense that judicialization through DSB proceedings is a
success, at least as far as compliance adjudication is concerned (of course, substantive
litigation is a different story). Indeed, this analysis reveals that compliance
proceedings overwhelmingly preserve the results winners obtained in prior
adjudication, protecting the interests such litigation vindicated only insofar as they
further trade liberalization. One should also recognize that adjudicators are helped by
the fact that they face a much clearer set of questions here than in substantive
litigation. At this stage, an offending member can either comply within a reasonable
period or not; the object of such compliance is no longer some abstract norm, but a
prior ruling by usually the same set of panelists; and determination of lawful levels of
retaliation in monetary terms, while technical at times, does not necessarily require
complex hermeneutic analysis. Arguably, previously sensitized adjudicators,
reviewing generally less complex questions, with more available information, can
more easily distinguish genuine compliance issues from mere dilatory tactics or
cheating behavior. In combination with the effect of shifts in erstwhile Complainant
and Respondent interests, these additional features help explain why bias need not be
present at this stage to ensure that WTO adjudication is self-consistent.
One could challenge the validity of these findings by arguing that mere
investigation of fully adjudicated compliance disputes cannot provide an
understanding of the general nature of WTO compliance adjudication, as several
disputes are settled after filing and others might be settled with no filing ever taking
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place. Arguments for the existence of a case selection effect in the compliance
context fail for two reasons. First, post-filing settlement activity has a limited impact
in the compliance litigation context, as three-quarters of all cases (61 of 81 cases) in
which a panel or arbitrator was requested have been fully adjudicated.82 This high
full-adjudication-to-filings ratio is the exact opposite of patterns observed in US civil
litigation, where only 1.8 percent83 of federal civil cases84 are fully adjudicated and
up to 72 percent of the disputes are terminated due to settlements.85 Clearly, the low
frequency of post-filing settlements in WTO compliance cases undercuts the selection
argument, as the subset of fully adjudicated disputes is fairly representative of what
takes place in overall litigation. Second, that settlements might have occurred
following substantive adjudication, thus eliminating potential compliance case
filings—indeed, 75 out of 117 substantive rulings never led to compliance filings86—
does not produce a selection effect relevant in this context. Because compliance
adjudication is only concerned with cases involving resistance to compliance, the
occurrence of settlements is irrelevant to this form of litigation since parties obviously
agreed to comply.
4.

The Aftermath of Compliance Litigation

The above analysis of compliance cases reveals an adjudicatory system
operating with high consistency, with erstwhile Complainants achieving a high rate of
success so long as they maintain pro-free trade positions. Of course, this still leaves
the question of whether winners are made whole through the system, meaning when
all litigation is done. As Table B.1 demonstrates, the DSB adjudicated disputes
concerning the level of suspension of concessions due to noncompliance in nine
cases.87 It authorized suspension of concessions in six cases.88 Of these, actual
82

See supra Table A.

83

Percentage from 2002. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
461 (2004).
84

Note that even in the realm of litigation that often involves high monetary stakes and
litigants with substantial resources, such as intellectual property cases, the rate of trials as a
percentage of dispositions is very low (2.4% in the US). See id. at 463;
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 PATENT AND TRADEMARK DAMAGES STUDY
(2007), available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/3ca24a75615f03948025711e004b69a0/$file/2
007_Patent_Study.pdf (reporting that the median award amount for 2005 was $6,000,000).
85

See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 729–33 (2004) (using data from 2000, including consent
judgments, but not cases disposed of through abandonment or default).
86

See supra Table A and accompanying discussion.

87

See also Appendix containing detailed information about these cases and the level of
suspensions authorized.
88

The suspensions were granted at DSB Meetings based on the requests of the WTO
members in the following disputes: DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/59 (Apr. 19, 1999) &
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retaliation occurred in only four instances, as Canada and Brazil chose not to impose
largely offsetting sanctions upon each other in the aftermath of their aircraft
disputes.89 Only two of the WTO's most powerful members, the EC (two cases) and
the US (two cases), failed to comply after compliance litigation had run its course and
submitted to retaliation.90 After a period of retaliation, the US eventually complied.91
WT/DSB/M/80 (May 18, 2000), request by US & Ecuador in European Communities–
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27; DSB Meeting
Minutes, WT/DSB/M/65 (July 26, 1999), requests by Canada and US in European
Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),WT/DS48 &
WT/DS26; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/94 (Dec. 12, 2000) request by Canada in
Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46; DSB Meeting Minutes,
WT/DSB/M/149 (May 7, 2003) request by EC in United States–Tax Treatment for Foreign
Sales (FSC), WT/DS108; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/145 (May 18, 2003), request by
Brazil in Canada–Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222;
DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/180 (Dec. 17, 2004) & WT/DSB/M/178 (Nov. 26, 2004),
requests by Brazil, EC, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico and Chile in United States–
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd), WT/ DS217 & WT/DS234. On
November 11, 2009, the WTO granted Brazil the right to apply sanctions against US products
up to $294.7 million annually. Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Gains WTO OK to Impose Sanctions
Over U.S. Cotton Subsidies, Weighs IP Rights, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1624 (Nov. 26,
2009). This authorization was not included in this article because I only considered decisions
made through September 2009.
89

See Daniel Pruzin, Brazil, Canada Agree to Postpone Action On Sanctions Request
Over Aircraft Subsidy, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1007 (June 6, 2002).
90

Sanctions have been imposed in the following cases: Arbitration Report, European
Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB
(Apr. 9, 1999)(for more information, see Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Issues Final
List of European Imports To Be Hit With Higher Duties in Banana Row, 16 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 621 (Apr. 14, 1999) and Alberto Alemano, European Court Rejects Damages
Claim from Innocent Bystanders in EU-US "Banana War", 12 ASIL INSIGHTS 21 (Oct. 11,
2008)); Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (see Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Annouces
Final List of EU Imports Targeted for Higher Duties in Beef Dispute, 16 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1212 (July 21, 1999)); Arbitration Report, United States–Tax Treatment for Foreign
Sales, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002) (see Alison Bennet & Katherine M. Stimmel,
Grassley, Baucus ETI Repeal Legislation Likely to Help Domestic Manufacturers, 20 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1156 (Aug. 10, 2003) and Joe Kirwin & Alison Bennett, EU Concerned
Over Grandfather Clause in Export Bill; No Decision Yet, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1714
(Oct. 21, 2004) and Daniel Pruzin & Alison Bennett, EU Challenges Transition Relief Under
New Export Tax Legislation, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1825 (Nov. 11, 2004)); Arbitration
Report, United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ARB
(Aug. 31, 2004) (see Daniel Pruzin, EU Reduces by Half U.S. Imports Targeted for Duties in
Byrd Dispute, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 622 (May 7, 2009) and Rossella Brevetti &
Michael O'Boyle, EC, Canada Move to Impose Retaliatory Duties in Byrd Dispute, 22 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 546 (Apr. 7, 2005) and Michael O'Boyle, Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties
on U.S. Goods Due to Noncompliance with WTO Byrd Ruling, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1386 (Aug. 25, 2005) and Daniel Pruzin, Remaining Complainants Warn of Intent To
Proceed With Byrd Sanctions by July, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 938 (June 9, 2005)).
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In December 2009, the EC reached an agreement with the United States and other
interested Latin American countries, who agreed to terminate WTO adjudication in
return for Brussels' firm commitment to lower tariffs on banana imports over a period
of time.92 Due to the implications of this settlement on its parallel commitment to
African, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP") banana producing nations, the EC offered
ACP nations tariff reductions on other tropical imports, a supposedly WTO-compliant
compromise likely to be included in a final Doha Round grand bargain.93 As of this
writing, the EC, citing strong public sentiment against removing restrictions on the
importation of hormone-treated beef,94 has yet to comply with the Hormones
decision. However, the EC has reached a side-agreement with the US allowing it to
maintain current restrictions in exchange for duty-free treatment for hormone-free
beef. Under this agreement, the US retains the right to continue suspending
concessions, which will be gradually phased out in four years.95
Arguably, it would be unfair to characterize EC conduct in these two instances
as demonstrative of outright disregard for compliance with international trade law or
that its leaders care little about its reputation for keeping promises. Paradoxically, at
least in the context of the Bananas dispute, EC recalcitrance resulted from caring
about their reputation for keeping promises of preferential treatment to bananas from
ACP countries pursuant to another agreement. Certainly, this agreement was
adjudicated as noncompliant with WTO law, and the EC took some time to comply.
Presumably, that was the case because compliance required reconciling two separate,
competing reputational concerns, EC's commitments to ACP countries and to other
WTO members. Thus, recalcitrance occurred not because of EC outright indifference
to compliance with international commitments, but precisely because it valued one
more than the other.96 While, arguably, this disaggregated, contextualized view of the
EC's reputational concerns does not account for EC noncompliance in the one
remaining case (i.e., Hormones), it suggests that one must proceed with caution
before making general statements about noncompliance, especially when one views
its rare occurrence as a major problem. Either way, one, two, four or six cases of
91

See Gary G. Yerkey, Dispute Resolution: Compliance Record of WTO Members in
Dispute Settlement Cases 'Very Good', WTO Reporter (BNA) (May 5, 2008) (stating that the
United States Congress passed legislation in 2004-05 to repeal all acts which were
inconsistent with WTO rulings).
92

Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: EU, Latin, U.S. Officials Welcome Beginning of End to
WTO Dispute on Banana Imports, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1733 (Dec. 17, 2009).
93

Id.

94

Davey, supra note 25 at 33.

95

Gary G. Yerkey and Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: U.S. Farm Group Disappointed with
Deal to Expand Hormone-Free Beef Sales to EU, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 643 (May 14,
2009); Gary G. Yerkey, Agriculture: U.S., EU Announce Provisional Deal in Long-Running
Dispute Over Beef Trade, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 611 (May 7, 2009).
96

For a similar argument in support of a nuanced, disaggregated view of reputation and
noncompliance, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 102-04.
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recalcitrance do not negate the overwhelming record of compliance. After all
litigation is done, erstwhile Complainants overwhelmingly obtain what they won in
substantive adjudication.
III.

Reassessing the Role of Noncompliance
A.

Legalist and Pragmatist Views on Noncompliance

As in the GATT years, the prospect of occasional noncompliance with dispute
settlement decisions has inspired debate about the proper level of sanctions in
international trade law. Legalists still interpret noncompliance as threat to the trade
system because, presumably, it allows protectionism to go unchecked. They do
recognize "the overall good record" of compliance is primarily due "to the good faith
desire of WTO members to see the dispute settlement system work effectively."97
The remedy, they suggest, is more detailed substantive and procedural rules,98 further
strengthening adjudication outcomes by allowing multilateral sanctions,99 and
generally a broader, more diversified array of sanctions.100
More pragmatically inclined scholars argue that further judicialization and
strengthening sanctions are unlikely to work because enforcement would still depend
on the will of states, not third-party adjudicators bereft of autonomous agency
powers.101 Pragmatists believe members themselves might not be so keen on stronger
sanctions and multilateral enforcement. Some of them believe harsher enforcement
rules might cause members to step back on enforcement because they would want to
"retain the flexibility to raise trade barriers when protectionist pressures surge."102
Others, still within this pragmatist group, might argue that members would stay their
hand under harsher rules not because they might engage in protectionism, but because
they might want to exercise the discretion they retained under the agreements in the
pursuit of legitimate trade restrictive measures more suited to their societies, with less
fear of exposure to tougher sanctions should the system rule against them.103
Furthermore, if members embraced collective sanctions, the proposed reforms
would have a perverse result, which legalists may not have fully thought through.
97

Davey, supra note 78 at 125.

98

See Davey, supra note 4 at 117-22.

99

See Pauwelyn, supra note 4 at 345.

100

See id. at 344-46; Davey, supra note 78 at 122-26; Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in
the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 795-808
(2000).
101

See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 161-62.

102

See id. at 162.

103

Unfortunately, the possibility that members might resort to trade restrictive measures
for reasons other than protectionism, as in the pursuit of legitimate policy concerns (e.g.,
adopting stricter health standards, protecting natural resources, etc.) has not been sufficiently
considered in the literature. But see Colares, supra note 2 at 438 and Rodrik, supra note 62 at
199.
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Under a multilateral sanction regime, third-party state protectionists would be the
only group to gain from suspending concessions against the "scofflaw" state, as
export groups in enforcing states "would be indifferent to any sanctioning strategy
because they would not have been affected by the trade-inconsistent measure."104 In
fact, should third-party states with weak protectionist constituencies choose
retaliation as a bargaining strategy to secure trade concessions from the scofflaw
state, they would not succeed. Under collective sanctions, any settlement offer would
have to be extended to all members (by operation of the MFN principle), whose cost
would be no different than the cost of retaliation.105 Finally, even in the unlikely
event that overall transaction and settlement costs did not equal the cost of retaliation,
the proliferation of PTAs would itself be an unwelcome result in a multilateral
system.
In fairness, legalists do not focus only on instances of noncompliance and how
to remedy them. Their reform proposals also target timeliness of compliance as a
problem, since delayed implementation can be a viable tactic until (and if) retaliation
is authorized. Davey, for instance, proposes speeding up the entire litigation system,
especially compliance deadlines, as he perceives them to be excessively generous.106
He regrets that the prospective nature of WTO remedies provides little incentive for
offending members to comply within the fifteen-month maximum "reasonable
compliance" period.107 He proposes not only shortening this to "six or nine months,"
but also starting the clock for compliance prior to the last day of such period, for
example, on the "date of adoption of the relevant report or date of panel establishment
or even earlier."108 Mavroidis even suggests allowing erstwhile Complainants to
request suspension of concessions prior to a formal decision on an Article 21(5)
Review,109 which, at present, must be decided before suspension requests can be
adjudicated.110 He argues that combining such requests in one proceeding would go a
long way towards reducing offending members' ability to further delay compliance by
extending litigation.111
While generous deadlines and procedural avenues may be abused, they do
exist for particularly instrumental reasons. In the absence of a veto, they give
members time and flexibility to adjust their practices while considering alternatives to
offending policies, even avoiding noncompliance altogether. Making the WTO
system more legalistic in the direction Davey and Mavroidis propose would
accelerate the arrival of the retaliation stage and put the system under more stress.
104

See Nzelibe, supra note 79 at 335-36.

105

See id. at 336.

106

See Davey, supra note 4 at 117-22.

107

DSU at art. 21(3)(c).

108

See Davey, supra note 4 at 121, 126.

109

Mavroidis, supra note 100 at 795.

110

See DSU, at art. 22(2).

111

Mavroidis, supra note 100 at 795.
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With less time for internal deliberations, some powerful offending members might
choose to absorb the cost of retaliation and remain noncompliant. Meanwhile, less
powerful members would be facing quite asymmetric incentives: as winners, they
might hesitate to sanction the powerful; as losers they will have less time to comply
or be ready to face sanctions. Moreover, this could further encourage bilateralism
and trade displacement by pushing members to negotiate PTAs, as these can replace
formerly illegal barriers with WTO-compliant barriers, without improving efficiency.
Such developments would severely undermine good faith among members,
potentially causing the multilateral system to unravel. In sum, by making the system
too brittle, further legalization of international trade risks too much.
In fact, even assuming trade diplomats, succumbing to legal
process/constructivist influences,112 convinced themselves that further judicialization
and stricter rules and deadlines would benefit all, it would hardly follow that the
states they represent would subsequently abide by these reforms. That trade
negotiators might lean toward greater normativity at one point does not imply that
they will continue to do so later when domestic interests are directly at stake, as in the
end of litigation. In its simplest form, the compliance "problem"—as the original
substantive violations that create it in the first place—occurs due to a mismatch
between a member's WTO commitments and either prevailing domestic political
economic interests or deeply held social values that must be politically tended to.
Such mismatches may develop and even intensify overtime. As Trachtman suggests,
the prevailing political constituencies backing entry into an agreement at one point
may either change with time or, even if they remain in control, might undergo
preference shifts as circumstances change.113 Because compliance seems to depend
"on the constellation of domestic political forces in the relevant state,"114 at a given
point in time, the possibility of retaliation and reputational loss, by itself, cannot exact
compliance. Thus, it is more likely that the relative influence of trade-restricting and
anti-sanction groups, not external forces or "internationalist" trade diplomats,
determines whether compliance will occur.115 It is true that harsher enforcement rules
give more leverage to the anti-sanction camp, yet they may still not prevail if the
losing member is persuaded by the other camp that it cannot compromise on an issue
deemed to be of "great national importance."116

112

See Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975,
981 (2005) (arguing that, overtime government officials from different states, influenced by
their interactions with international institutions and each other, may undergo a switch in
preferences that will favor greater norm internalization over their own states' more parochial
interests.).
113

See Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The
Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law 1, 11 (Apr. 18, 2010) available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1549337.
114

See id. at 21.

115

Answering this empirical question would be beyond the scope of this article.

116

See Guzman, supra note 64 at 321.
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The Role and Merits of Noncompliance

Legalists believe that increasing the sanctions for breach of WTO obligations
would increase the commitment level of WTO members. This generally assumes that
the existing sanction (i.e., suspension of concessions following bilateral substantive
and compliance litigation) is somehow suboptimal. The discussion above (Part III.A)
suggests why that is not the case. Indeed, members, whose actions are often the
product of considered calculations reflecting domestic interests, might not be so keen
on a more severe enforcement system that would limit the remaining flexibility they
have in trade policy, especially in light of the consistent record of Complainant wins
in WTO adjudication. In a way, it is as if legalists were arguing from the perspective
of a dissatisfied adjudicator, in whose institutional view a few instances of less than
full compliance are ipso facto proof that compliance incentives are less than adequate.
While it would be unfair to characterize legalists as essentially making the same
"strengthening the system" arguments WTO adjudicators and Secretariat staff are
likely to endorse, it is unquestionable that the reforms they propose would lead to yet
more judicialization and transfer of authority from members to adjudicators, with
potentially disastrous results.
More plausibly, legalists make these arguments because they overemphasize
the adjudicative dimension of the WTO system while underestimating its far more
important political dimensions, international and domestic. They generally fail to see
that adjudication, as a generally egalitarian mode of interaction, is, in principle,
unresponsive to the logic of power and the implications resulting from power
asymmetries. True, WTO litigants are equal before the law and play by rules of
engagement that, at least as far as courtroom activity is concerned, "do not permit
them to deploy all their resources in the conflict, but require that they proceed within
the limiting forms" of adjudication.117 Yet, when the assumption of adjudicative
equality clashes (outside the courtroom) with the reality of power as it expresses itself
in outright noncompliance or delayed compliance—the US and the EC are the only
members to have endured sanctions while not complying—legalists react by
proposing reforms that would make the system more like domestic adjudication,
where enforcement is presumed optimal.118 In doing so, they rarely give full
consideration to the political and systemic repercussions of their presumably
apolitical reforms. Obviously, the DSB system is not merely about adjudication. In
fact, a more nuanced political view of the DSB's judicial function counsels against
not only shifting members' rights and obligations "in a systematic way [that] would
contradict the delicate political balancing act that characterizes multilateral trade
negotiations,"119 as has happened in substantive adjudication, but also any further
117

Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 135 (1974).
118

Davey recognizes that "most long-term non-compliance has occurred in disputes
between developed countries," but does not investigate further why that might be the case.
See Davey, supra note 78 at 123 n. 30.
119

Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2004).
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restraints on their ability to cope with and adapt to the effects of DSB decisions, as
legalists now propose.
Having won the earlier Uruguay Round battle that led to more judicialized
proceedings and clearer sanctions over GATT's looser framework, where states could
openly negotiate on a case-by-case basis and even block the adoption of decisions,120
legalists seem to be pressing their case too hard this time. First, in light of the
evidence presented in Part II.B.3 & 4, outright noncompliance is rare and mostly
reflects situations where powerful nations have faced complex choices as they
attempt to balance domestic pressures against important policy considerations
(Hormones, FSC and Byrd) or competing multilateral concerns (Bananas). Similarly,
rather than abuse of process, instances of delay followed by compliance might be
viewed more generously, allowing the possibility of sanctions and the passage of time
to work together. Second, as discussed in Part III.A, shorter deadlines and steeper
sanctions will not strengthen the system's normativity if third-party adjudicators,
lacking the power of agency, have to rely on members' enforcement capabilities, who
themselves face asymmetric incentives to comply and punish. Indeed, one (bilateral)
version of this harsher enforcement regime might even lead to a hard-to-reverse spiral
toward bilateralism, as members scramble to evade sanctions by negotiating PTAs
that displace more efficient producers, undermining good faith among members and
demoralizing those in favor of multilateralism. A multilateral or collective sanction
system would fare no better.
Finally, with the advent of the DSU, members signed away the possibility of
blocking enforcement by adopting the reverse consensus rule. A triumph of legalism,
no doubt, this implies that, in politically sensitive disputes, members now have fewer
options when facing adverse outcomes. In such a system, members' valuation of time
undergoes a profound change. Specifically, after a period of violation and subsequent
litigation, a protracted return to compliance might become the next best alternative, as
the passage of time might be sufficient to appease prevailing trade-restricting
constituencies.121 In fact, time becomes even more important to the non-cynical
violator who, genuinely believing no violation was committed, will attempt to
mitigate the effects of an adverse decision by either delaying compliance, not
complying and submitting to sanctions or proposing concessions in other areas.122 If
one recalls that the veto's abrogation was part and parcel of a move toward increased
judicialization of the world trade system, which replaced regular diplomatic
negotiations with a permanent Appellate Body and continuously evolving trade
jurisprudence, one may plausibly argue that recalcitrance and low levels of
120

See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 94-96
(1987).
121

Goldsmith and Posner make a similar argument to explain members' return to
compliance. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 157.
122

See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Reaches Agreement with EU at WTO on Compensation
for Internet Gambling, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1788 (Dec. 20, 2007) (quoting Gretchen
Hamel, Spokeswoman for the Office of the US Trade Representative, stating that "the
binding commitments will be extended to all WTO members.").
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noncompliance might play an inevitable, even necessary "cushioning" role in the
system.
Conclusion
International trade law scholars have demonstrably different views on
compliance and enforcement of legal obligations. One of the important research
questions in the field, a point in which scholars have marked disagreement, pertains
to the desirability of further reforms to strengthen compliance. This article considers
their different arguments in succession and attempts to integrate into this debate
insights derived from prior empirical studies on substantive adjudication, adding a
new empirical analysis of compliance adjudication. These analyses show that
Complainants' systematic high rates of success in substantive adjudication can be
attributed to WTO adjudicators' adoption of a liberal view of free trade that furthers
the interests Complainants typically represent at that stage, but that the latter only
attain a similar degree of success in compliance litigation when they continue to act
on behalf of pro-free trade interests. For example, erstwhile Complainants win only
one in three level-of-retaliation disputes; i.e., disputes where they are pursuing trade
restrictions as the final punishment for noncompliance.
Viewed in combination, these modes of litigation reveal an adjudicatory
system operating with high consistency, yet exhibiting favoritism toward a particular
teleological view of free trade, expressed not in favor of the litigant who originally
defended it, but in favor of whoever argues for it in any given instance. In light of the
way the system has operated, with members' reserved regulatory discretion under
continuous attack from a jurisprudence bent on furthering a liberal view of trade, it is
remarkable that compliance levels have remained high, despite members' occasional,
strong criticism.123 That few architects of increased legalization "contemplated the
possibility that in interpreting WTO agreements, the [AB] would engage in expansive
lawmaking"124—a view that, in hindsight, seems a bit naïve—should cause scholars
to be a bit more cautious when considering yet more rigidifying reforms. In fact, the
remaining alternatives for coping with the way the DSB system has operated may be
viewed, in a sense, as the new veto. Simply put, reforming the system to make it yet
more "legalistic" would be unwarranted, as such proposals would make it too rigid
and unaccommodating and might push its more powerful members toward outright
bilateralism, eventually causing it to collapse. In fact, compliance is the least of the
system's problems.

123

See Dunoff, supra note 25 at 353 (discussing US proposals "to increase party control
over the dispute settlement process," and US and Chile's arguments for "the desirability of
providing 'additional guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies,' including with respect to the
rules of interpretation of the WTO agreements, and ensuring that panel members have
appropriate expertise.") (quoting Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States (14
March 2003) TN/DS/W/52.)
124

Steinberg, supra note 119 at 251 n. 27 (citing telephone interview with A. Jane
Bradley, former Assistant US Trade Representative for Monitoring and Enforcement and US
Representative to the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Negotiations).
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APPENDIX125
Authorized Suspension of Concessions from January 1, 1995 through September 30, 2009

Date of DSB Authorization
to
Suspend Concessions

Level of
Suspension

09.04.99
WT/DS27/ARB

Pursuant to the US request
(WT/DS27/49) authorization
was granted at the DSB
meeting on 19.04.99
(WT/DSB/M/59)

Up to $191.4
million per year

24.03.00
WT/DS27/ARB/
ECU

Pursuant to Ecuador's request
(WT/DS27/54) authorization
was granted at the DSB
meeting on 18.05.00
(WT/DSB/M/80)

~

2.

European Communities –
Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products
(Hormones)
May 17, 1999

12.07.99
WT/DS26/ARB
WT/DS48/ARB

Pursuant to the US request
(WT/DS26/21)
and Canada's request
(WT/DS48/19)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on 26.07.99
(WT/DSB/M/65)

$116.8 million per
year

3.

Brazil – Export Financing
Programme for Aircraft
May 10, 2000

28.08.00
WT/DS46/ARB

Pursuant to Canada's request
(WT/DS46/25)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on 12.12.00
(WT/DSB/M/94)

~

4.

30.08.02
WT/DS108/ARB

Pursuant to the EC's request
(WT/DS108/26)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on 07.05.03
(WT/DSB/M/149)

$4.043 billion per
year

Dispute and Date Initiated
1(a). European Communities –
Regime for the
Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas
Jan. 14, 1999
1(b). European Communities –
Regime for the
Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas
Nov. 8, 1999

United States – Tax
Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations"
Nov. 17, 2000

Report of the
Arbitrator

125

See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, Annual Overview, Annual Report
2009, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=
browse&q1=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+%28WT%FCDSB%FC%2A%29+and+%40meta%
5FTitle+Overview+of+the+state+of+play+of+WTO+disputes+and+not+Draft+Annual+Repo
rt%29+&language=1.
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Report of the
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Date of DSB Authorization
to
Suspend Concessions

5.

Canada – Export Credits
and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft
May 23, 2002

17.02.03
WT/DS222/ARB

Pursuant to Brazil's request
(WT/DS222/10)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on
18.03.03
(WT/DSB/M/145)

6.

31.08.04
WT/DS217/ARB/
BRA
WT/DS217/ARB/
CHL
WT/DS217/ARB/
EEC
WT/DS217/ARB/
IND
WT/DS217/ARB/
JPN
WT/DS217/ARB/
KOR
WT/DS234/ARB/
CAN
WT/DS234/ARB/
MEX

Pursuant to the requests by
Brazil (WT/DS217/38);
the EC (WT/DS217/39);
India (WT/DS217/40);
Japan (WT/DS217/41);
Korea (WT/DS217/42);
Canada (WT/DS234/31);
Mexico (WT/DS234/32),
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on 26.11.04
(WT/DSB/M/178)

United States – Continued
Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000
Jan. 15, 2004
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Pursuant to the request by
Chile (WT/DS217/43)
authorization was granted at
the DSB meeting on 17.12.04
(WT/DSB/M/180)

Level of
Suspension

E.C.: $1.1 million
per year
Japan: $16.49
million per year

